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Introduction: Muslim Dolls as Religious 
Visual Culture
Muslim dolls are a new phenomenon within 
contemporary popular Islamic culture,  particularly in 
Indonesia. While most contemporary Indonesian Isla-
mist movements like Salafism (neo-Wahabism) are 
deeply influenced by transnational Islamist ideologies 
and thus reject any figures of humans,1  moderate Sa-
lafists often allow children to play with dolls. This  ac-
ceptance is based on the Hhadits that spoke about 
Aisyah, the youngest wife of the Prophet,  playing with a 
type of doll when she was about nine years old. 
Despite this acceptance, many conservatives still argue 
that Aisyah’s doll was not precisely a human-shaped 
doll.
Muslim dolls  emerged in Indonesia in 2005, soon 
after the reformation era2  when Islamic movements 
emerged more prominently in public spheres, marking 
a modern turn in the evolution of Islamic movements. 
Along with this transition into modernity, members of 
various Muslim organizations that married and built 
families began to consider secular toys for their chil-
dren’s entertainment, particularly dolls. Not only were 
Muslim parents concerned about whether toys were or 
were not Islamic in nature—a crucial point considering 
conflicting opinions among Islamic authorities 
regarding dolls—but these parents also had pragmatic 
concerns regarding the safety, educational value, and 
affordability of toys.  Toy makers developed creative 
strategies in order to take these concerns into account. 
Muslim dolls and other popular “Islamic”imagery in 
popular culture—such as  busana Muslim (Islamic 
clothes), Islamic stickers, Islamic music performances, 
among others—represent a huge material database for 
“religious visual culture.”  Currently, there are various 
scholars engaged with contemporary Islamic visual 
culture in Indonesia: Budiyanto (2006) and Lukens-
Bull (2005) have written about Islamic stickers, while 
Carla Jones (2007) and Nuraini  Juliastuti (2003) have 
examined Muslim clothing. Most of these scholars have 
utilized various media and cultural studies theories and 
methods in their study of Islamic visual culture. In re-
cent decades, as Brent Plate (2002) notes, religious 
scholars have shifted away from “verbal-textual” 
doctrines toward the visual and material artifacts con-
stituting religious “practice.”3  David Morgan (2000) 
similarly observes visual imagery’s significance in 
religious practices:
[T]he new study of religious visual culture begins 
with the assumption that visual artifacts should not 
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be segregated from the experience of ceremony, 
education, commerce or prayer. Visual practices 
help fabricate the worlds in which people live and 
therefore present a promising way of deepening our 
understanding of how religions work.4
Both Morgan and Plate stress the significance of vis-
ual imagery, not only as a component of performances, 
rituals,  and ceremonies, but also for understanding 
these practices themselves. 
Beyond contributing to and serving as a lens through 
which to analyze rituals, religious visual imagery can 
serve as  a point of departure into discourses relating to 
broader social issues and contexts.   Plate states that 
visual culture offers: 
an attempt to talk about the visual components that 
are imbedded in everyday life [and] is engaged 
with the production and the reception of visual 
objects, the makers and the viewers. And in this 
mode of analysis, gender, sex, race, nationality, 
religion, family, and other forces of identification 
come to play a vital role in the construction of the 
way we look and are looked at. These components 
of identity affect the way images are produced and 
reproduced, and how such images are viewed, and 
by whom.5
These social concerns provide fruitful ground for 
research, as the majority of the scholarship about 
Islamic arts tends to focus on the “fine arts’”such as 
calligraphy and architecture,  including Plate’s  own 
books on religious visual culture. This paper will ana-
lyze the phenomenon of Indonesian Muslim dolls as  an 
expression of religious visual culture and scrutinize 
popular Islamic materialist culture by taking into ac-
count Plate’s “field of vision,” a comprehensive ana-
lytical methodology for examining the visual compo-
nents in the Indonesian community. 6 Additionally,  I 
explore some of the religious and social issues that 
arise when considering Muslim dolls as visual culture 
in Indonesia, focusing particularly on the ways 
religious transnationalism and globalization impact 
this phenomenon.  Specifically, I will examine the va-
rieties of religious transnationalism7  that have influ-
enced the emergence of the Muslim doll in Indonesia. 
Through these issues, I will note the waves of globali-
zation—or, flows of religious, social, and economic 
content through increasingly connected agents from 
around the world—that are exposed by the Islamic doll 
phenomenon.   Lastly, I will consider Indonesian Mus-
lims’s reception and interpretation of the specifically 
Indonesian character of these Islamic dolls.
Barbie: A Story of the Globalized 
’Secular’ Doll
The birth of the modern doll is  represented by the 
production of a global phenomenon known as Barbie. 
Barbie was created in 1959 by Ruth Handler,  and is, in 
many ways,  an icon of Western consumerism, celebrat-
ing Western aristocratic and bourgeois values and 
lifestyles.  To those living in the non-Western world, 
this ideal of a modern, high-class lifestyle has long 
been an obsession, but it is also frequently critiqued 
for eroding traditional cultural values.8  As an emblem 
of Western modernity, Barbie’s image sparks such 
ambivalence (see Figure 1).
Despite critiques of Barbie, she can be found in 
countries around the world, just as  bourgeois values 
and lifestyles are not exclusive to Western civilization. 
Yet, the imagery of wealth, elegance, and fantasy that 
Barbie embodies  can be traced in history: for instance, 
fantastic affluence characterizes many epic stories of 
princes and princesses that exist in various civilizations 
around the world.  This affluence is present in the 
Islamic tale of One Thousand and One Nights, the 
adventures of Prince Panji of Java, or in any folklore 
from China, India, Japan, and in other countries and 
historical civilizations. 
Acknowledging her international appeal, makers of 
Barbie have attempted to fuse, and possibly appropri-
ate non-Western cultures, by creating special edition 
dolls whose clothing and packaging adhere to stereo-
typed national images (see Image 1).  These questions 
about Barbie’s international appeal and cultural adapt-
ability are important to consider as popular culture 
becomes increasingly global. Pierre Bourdieu’s notion 
of the habitus helps illustrate the complications that 
arise at sites of cultural intersection.  “A set of durable 
practices, values, and dispositions which is both 
structured and structuring,” the habitus represents  the 
“context in which we understand the world and acquire 
beliefs,  values and knowledge through practice.”9  We 
might therefore understand Barbie’s status as an icon 
of bourgeois culture as an effect of cultural practices of 
the West.  Yet, as a global commodity, Barbie’s  popu-
larity threatens to export Western values and sensibili-
ties into global culture.  This global culture can be 
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understood as threatening to an Indonesian Muslim 
who is characterized by practices that are influenced by 
his or her own habitus (e.g. Islamic culture).   This 
cultural intersection between West and non-West that 
global capitalism helps produce—we see this 
particularly with Mattel’s global marketing strategi-
es—can place differing cultural practices into conflict.  
In Barbie Culture, Mary F. Rogers recognizes the 
Muslim world’s anxiety over the cultural intrusion that 
Barbie represents, suggesting that Barbie can alienate 
many around the world, as her image reflects racism, 
sexism, consumerism, and materialism. For many 
Muslims,  Barbie’s world is perceived as a kind of “fan-
tasy of consumption,” a world that is far from the real-
ity most girls face. Barbie idealizes white skin, light 
hair,  blue eyes, a thin body-shape, Western concep-
tions of beauty and, above all else, fashionable upper-
class appeal.  This reflects the existence of social and 
cultural heirarchies in which “whiteness” is  under-
stood stereotypically as clean, good looking, honor-
able, successful, morally good, healthy and charming. 
For that reason, Barbie has also become representative 
of Western popular culture and the associated 
“American Dream” ideology. In this sense, the world 
of Barbie appears to be normative in popular culture: 
these ideologies of wealth and consumption differ sig-
nificantly from the ideal world of Islamic norms and 
values.10 
Transnational Islamic Piety for the 
Modern World
Markets and politics are two sides of one coin:  they 
are inseparable and infused with cultural values and 
practices. For instance, the conflicts in the Middle East 
seem to have no certain solution because of continuous 
fighting for natural resources, political interests,  and 
religious pride and honor.  Each of these conflicts in-
termingles and overlaps with other conflicts whose 
origins are not precisely known.  Islam has historically 
been a highly political religion, a source of ideologies 
deeply rooted in the Middle East, and continuously 
evolving concomitantly with developments in modern 
political, economic,  and cultural realities.  These 
modern developments, combined with Western-
European imperialism, have challenged political Is-
lam’s status within the global community.  This ideo-
logical conflict illustrates Islam’s status as a global and 
hegemonic power, and, it should be noted, Islam’s own 
ideologies have both positive and negative influences 
upon others in the world.11
In The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington 
predicts the emergence of Islam (and China) as a 
counter power toward the West is imminent.12 
Huntington claims that since the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire there has been an ongoing struggle to regain 
the previous political, economic and cultural power of 
Islam.  The struggle to create a pan-Islamism in the late 
nineteenth century seemingly failed to solidify because 
of the emergence of the modern, Western state.13 
These circumstances set the stage for the emergence of 
modern Islamic nations, both in the Middle East and 
the rest of the Islamic world.  In the 1990s the Islamic 
’civilization’ movement became a political strategy 
intending to create an Islamic society characterized by 
the Islamization of everything, and was initially led by 
Ismail Raji Al-Faruqi.14  Budiyanto (2006) notes that 
throughout the various global Islamic movements in 
the 1990s, including the one in Indonesia, a common 
theme was the notion that the umma,  or Muslim 
community, was an important element in Islamic activ-
ism.  Thus, the Islamization of society, not the state, 
emerged as the strategy for constructing and building 
the imagined universal umma.15  While this 
contemporary transnational Islamic movement was 
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initially inspired by the Ikhwanul Muslimin, a 
transnational Islamic movement arising in Egypt in 
193916, its new strategy, as Oliver Roy (2004) argues,  is 
focused on Islamizing society rather than Islamizing 
the State:  “The neo-fundamentalists of Islam reject the 
political struggle as means of establishing such a state. 
They believe that an Islamic state should result from 
the re-Islamization of the umma and should not be a 
tool for this re-Islamization”.17  Seeing the West’s he-
gemonic cultural power in the global marketplace as a 
threat to the fate and faith of the young generation, 
Muslims countered by creating cultural commodities of 
their own. One example of this cultural response is the 
creation of Arrosa, the Muslim doll. 
The phenomenon of the Indonesian Muslim doll was 
motivated by ideas of transnational Islam, suggests its 
creators.  Umining Dwi Kusminarti (Atiek), the 
Director of PT Haula Sejahtera, one of the creators  of 
the Arrosa Islamic doll, notes that a Muslim doll was 
already being manufactured in the Middle East and that 
it was similar to a Barbie doll.  This inspired the crea-
tion of a new doll, one with Muslim clothes.   She 
wanted the female doll to wear the jilbab (the head-
scarf) and the male dolls to wear the songkok (a rimless 
cap).  “This Muslim doll is heavily laden with Islamic 
faith and values,” said Atiek, a mother of four 
daughters.”18
Atiek, who created Arrosa with her friend Asrul 
Iman, recalled that their inspiration to create a Muslim 
doll first came when they realized there were no dolls 
dressed in Islamic clothing available for her daughter. 
Although a doll named Razzane existed in Malaysia, 
these dolls were difficult,  if not impossible, to obtain. 
Atiek decided then to make the Muslim dolls herself. 
Atiek markets  the Arrosa doll primarily through the 
Internet to surrounding cities in Java and neighboring 
countries. She notes that currently there are many or-
ders from Bandung, Balikpapan, Duri, Surabaya, Bah-
kan,  and even Abu Dhabi and Singapore, but Atiek also 
admits a desire to expand distribution into foreign 
markets; for instance, Malaysia where there appears to 
be a similar interest in dolls with Islamic clothing.19
It can be said that Muslim dolls, as a subculture of  the 
Islamic world, represent a counter to the cultural he-
gemony that Barbie symbolizes. However, Arrosa is 
not a purely Muslim creation.  Her main material com-
ponents are products of the global market: she is  origi-
nally made in China.  Rather than manufacture her own 
doll, Atiek instead purchased a plastic molded doll 
from China and dressed it up.20 However,  dolls  from 
China generally have western faces, although most 
consumers want an Asian or Middle-Eastern looking 
doll.  If  the demand for the doll continues to grow, 
Atiek will manufacture her own doll, including addi-
tional clothing, such as wedding dresses, traditional 
Indonesian clothes and other accessories, such as a 
prayer carpet, rosary, and musholla.21
Unlike what was suggested by George Ritzer that,  “it 
is  much easier to export things in a form of ‘nothing’ 
throughout the whole world, rather than to export 
things in a form of ‘something,’”22  Muslim dolls, which 
are full of Islamic attributes and values, sell well glob-
ally,  similar to Barbie, thereby complicating Ritzer’s 
theorization of the circulation of commodities.  Muslim 
dolls are infused with unique attributes that give them 
value as something.  They are conceptually bound with 
Islamic culture (as simultaneously a local and global 
religious and cultural movement), with temporal speci-
ficity (modernity), with humanism, and enchantment.23 
This complexity in the depiction of a Muslim is  em-
blematic of the segmented sentiment of the Muslim 
community, which has traditionally had a vast global 
presence since the early part of thirteenth century. 
Considering this background, the Muslim doll serves 
as an effective media and consumer tool for shaping the 
Muslim consciousness in the context of global and 
universal Islamic world values.24 As a material object in 
circulation, the Muslim dolls—with all of their accesso-
ries and products—facilitates the spread of local Islamic 
values to influence transnational religious culture.
Muslim Doll: The Birth of Visual Mimicry 
The Muslim doll is a phenomenon of the early 21st 
century, first appearing in the Middle East in 2004 
with the launching of the Fulla doll by NewBoy 
International in Syria.  The doll, Fulla, named for a 
genus of jasmine flower that grows in the Middle East, 
quickly became a bestselling item. In contrast to Bar-
bie’s blond hair and blue eyes, Fulla has black hair and 
brown eyes, and she is  dressed in long dresses and 
skirts that cover her knees.25 (See Figure 2).
In 2005, two new Muslim dolls came to the market: 
Razzane,  created by Ammar Saadeh and Sherrie 
Saadeh, and Arrossa. The Saadehs say that they created 
the Razzane doll as an alternative doll for Muslim girls 
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Figure 2. (right)
Fulla Doll Display, 
courtesy 
Gerry  May
and boys. In contrast to Barbie’s sexual appearance and 
pronounced bust,  Razanne appears modest, with 
clothes that cover her body, including the jilbab. 
According to the Saadehs, Razzane portrays the ideal 
character traits  for young Muslim women, such as an 
unpretentious appearance, kindness, good manners, 
and piety (taqwa and sholehat). At the time they cre-
ated Razanne, the Saadehs felt there were not any 
models of Barbie that were positive for Muslim girls.26 
Razanne was created as a tool for Muslim girls to learn 
the values of education and religiosity,  not as an object 
of admiration that encourages girls to obsess over their 
own bodies. Razanne is available in three versions: 
white skin with blonde hair, light brown skin with black 
hair,  and dark skin with black hair. Representing an 
image of  an idealized modern Muslim woman, Razzane 
is  popular in Kuwait,  United Arab Emirates,  and in 
Southeast Asian countries, and is also sold in America, 
Canada, and Germany.27
From this short history it is clear that the birth of the 
Muslim doll is representative of “mass-popular-art” 
that emerges as an effect of the recent revitalization of 
Islamic consciousness throughout global Islamic 
communities.  This Islamic consciousness has devel-
oped in the face of the perceived dominance of West-
ern culture and values, and is intended to stimulate 
discourses that will lead to a return to the day of “glori-
ous Islam”. This counter-hegemonic consciousness 
can be traced back to the latter part of  nineteenth 
century.28  The Muslim doll illustrates the discursive 
shift in Islamic movements’ gaze from state to society, 
with its argot doctrines asserting that Islam is revealed 
to all of mankind as the way of al-akhlakul al-karimah 
(Islamic moral kindness) and al-rahmatan lil al-alamin 
(Islamic universal values).  These discourses are also 
likely a response to the paranoia of Islam in the West-
ern world after the tragedy of 9/11. Recognizing the 
cultural hegemony and paranoia of the West, the 
Islamic consciousness is  able to focus its anxieties 
towards countering imperialist images, such as those 
that Barbie represents.  
The Barbie doll is not just a representation of certain 
cultural values, but is believed by many in the Islamic 
world,  including many Indonesians, to be 
representative of Western culture as jahilliyah, or 
ignorant and led by “American-Zionist Jews.”29  
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Muslim dolls serve to strengthen the religious identity 
of children and develop a Muslim imaginary that is 
closer to reality. Nevertheless, the problematic imagery 
of the perfect Barbie body does not disappear for the 
modern Muslim doll, especially with Muslim dolls 
made in Indonesia. This is an example of what Rene 
Girard describes as  a “mechanism of mimetic/mimesis 
desire.”30   The Indonesian doll is representative of the 
Muslim desire to be a part of the advancement and 
modernization that is associated with Western civiliza-
tion, while simultaneously being different. Although 
the Muslim doll makers prefer to create an “indigenous 
brown-looking doll,” the very fact that this doll must 
imitate Barbie indicates Barbie’s power as a market 
icon. The Muslim doll in Indonesia does not appear in 
the market on its own terms: it must reference and 
respond to Barbie.  Every aspect of the doll, from its 
inception to its  aesthetic values, is labeled as explicitly 
“Islamic,” yet almost all of the materials  and processes 
are identical to Barbie’s, including the bright pink 
color of the packaging. 
Still, this mimicry can be a form of cultural contesta-
tion. Sara Ahmed argues (in Prabasmoro, 2003, pp. 
94-95) that through mimicry the Muslim doll hybrid-
izes Barbie to challenge the doll’s claim to originality 
and authenticity.31 At the same time, next to Barbie, the 
Muslim dolls disclose the dialectical interaction of a 
multitude of dualisms (e.g. master/slave,  West/non-
West, other/self, global/local, etc.). The global/local 
dialectic is notable,  in the context of globalization and 
transnational Islam.   As the Muslim doll mimics West-
ern Barbie, Muslims articulate local (Islamic) values via 
a global language of dolls and markets. 32
Furthermore,  an ironic and paradoxical conscious-
ness among Muslims has seemingly emerged, as can be 
seen by the racial claims of Muslim-ness by the Razzane 
and Fullas dolls. The creators of Razzane and Fullas 
regard dolls that physically resemble Muslims as  some-
how inappropriate for a bule, or westerner, to own. 
Yet, many Muslims in Europe, the Middle East, and 
even in America have diverse types of  bodies, hair, and 
eyes, and also speak “bule” languages. This demoniz-
ing of Westerners as ‘others’ accentuates the paradox 
of transnational Islam in Indonesia, where at once it 
presumes a universalistic stance that goes beyond ra-
cial and geographical claims, but simultaneously shows 
insularity.
Muslim Dolls: Where Art, Politics, 
Consumerism and Religion Overlap
If we agree that the Muslim dolls are a visual art form, 
or at least stand as images of Islamic popular visual 
culture, it is important to consider them not only as a 
commodity, but also within the context of Islamic 
political culture.  As mentioned previously, the doll 
was created to disseminate the symbolic and aesthetic 
values of Islam, thereby contributing to the increase of 
Islam’s political profile in the popular media. The crea-
tors understand that their target audience recognizes 
and appreciates the importance of Islamic cultural val-
ues. Not only do the dolls’ creators experience 
economic gain by producing the dolls, but they also 
share in cultural and symbolic gains that come with the 
dissemination of Islamic images of faith and piety. 
Muslim consumers also share in these symbolic bene-
fits,  Atiek confirms: “[This doll] is  made as media to 
support education and early educational activity in 
disseminating Islamic values ... The birth of  Arrosa 
itself  is a response to an alternative choice of various 
dolls in the market.  But, because those dolls are gener-
ally wearing ordinary clothes, we try to sell dolls with 
Islamic clothes.”33  Thus, the Muslim doll becomes a 
symbol of the artistic doll, an aspect of Islamic art,  but 
also a promising business venture with vast market 
potential, with the addition of  a political identity em-
bedded with the primary values of Islam.  Presently 
Arrosa is exporting its  doll-clothes products  to Amer-
ica specially designed for Razzane.34   Also, in a rela-
tively short span of time, Fulla has penetrated the 
Indonesian market. 
The Muslim doll represents the ways religion, poli-
tics, art and economics blend in public space and 
modern markets.  The production of both secular and 
religious material culture in public space is generally 
aimed to appeal to the interests of their prospective 
customers.  The crucial distinction between secular 
consumer products and religious ones is the embedded 
aura of religious value within the latter. Products of 
religious culture are seen by consumers to have 
religious and spiritual attributes, while,  ironically, also 
having an economic value that characterizes material-
ity. The producer of any product, including Muslim 
dolls, must think about capital, costs, and the efficiency 
and profitability of production. 35  Conveniently, 
Muslim dolls  are a product that is relatively easy and 
inexpensive to market,  because their consumers have 
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become a voluntary marketing network through their 
pengajian and arisan, and through political activities.36 
Moreover, the market for religious materials  and prod-
ucts is actually broad and relatively stable.
The producers of the Muslim dolls clearly 
understand the needs their consumers—Muslim fami-
lies with children—who wish to be more reflective of 
religious tenets and guidance. This contrasts with the 
products created by secular producers, which are as-
sumed by religious consumers to promote modern 
lifestyles and aesthetics that reflects the interest of the 
producers only.37  Producers and consumers of 
religious products speak of a similar “call” for piety 
that transcends business needs. Does it mean that the 
producer of religious products tends to prioritize the 
religious piety rather than business? The producers of 
religious products often believe that spirituality is 
more important than economics;  still, in Islam, being 
profit-oriented is not a sin. 
Although the Muslim doll is a commodity with an 
image that circulates through social and media net-
works, the fact that it has a physical, three-dimensional 
form should not be overlooked.  These dolls  are not 
just ideas, but physical objects  that have close contact 
with consumers’ bodies and minds through play.  Thus 
we see the intersection of religious, political,  cultural, 
and economic forces coming together in the physical 
act of childrens’ play and pleasure. 
Additionally, Muslim consumers can identify with the 
Muslim doll.  This identification makes parents more 
secure with the Muslim doll than other dolls, because 
this doll looks like people in their own community and 
would likely have similar everyday values and practices 
(habitus).  Consumers also enjoy repeatedly playing 
with Muslim dolls including purchasing new dolls, 
clothes and accessories. In this concern for the doll, 
children and parents (and nannies) that play with and 
talk about the characters of their Muslim dolls develop 
strong psychological ties to their dolls. This engage-
ment in the imaginative world of  the Muslim dolls oc-
curs whenever they are played with. Moreover, when 
imagining their dolls in a certain setting, narrative,  or 
staged, diorama-like scene,  children and parents might 
experience a pleasurable sense of disconnection from 
the real world; yet, Muslim values remain a central 
component of this play.  Pleasure is also a component of 
consumption itself,  and the commodification of relig-
ion, particularly in Islam, is not taboo. Throughout 
history religious commodities (e.g.  religious relics) 
have been prominently featured.38 In fact, public space 
in Islam is always seen (ideally or imaginatively) as to-
tally religious space, as evidenced by the notion of pub-
lic society as umma.39
Therefore, even as modernity continues to reshape 
our lives and the world, the public spaces that emerge 
do not undermine the existence of religious culture 
and religious public space. This conception of religion 
and public space runs counter to suggestions by schol-
ars who claim that modernity will fully secularize this 
space. Indeed, religious commodities have flourished 
in the market, as  religion continues to adapt to evolv-
ing expressive modes to communicate its ideas and 
realities.  The Muslim doll represents one such mani-
festation of this adaptation. 
Muslim Dolls and Indonesian-ness: A Remark
Due to the combination of  Islam’s extensive history 
in Indonesia and the quantity of Muslims living within 
its borders today, Islam is clearly influential in the for-
mation of  Indonesian identity.40 As I have argued, the 
Muslim doll stands at the intersection of the local and 
global, the national and transnational:  it is a hybrid 
cultural product of modern Indonesia and global Islam. 
It is also worth noting that the appearances of these 
Muslim dolls, especially Arrosa, resemble the urban 
elite class of Muslims.  Atiek admits that she follows 
fashion trends, since not all Muslims wear the jilbab or 
the songkok.  She notes that she wanted the dolls to be 
more fashionable,  including having the dolls wear 
skirts and pants.41  The clothing of these Muslim dolls 
therefore resembles what Carla Jones observes as bu-
sana Muslim, which represents the historical discourse 
and interpretation of state understandings of 
Indonesian-ness, modernity, and Islamic tradition in 
the practices of piety and modernity.42
On the other hand, Islamic fashion does not garner 
significant resistance from traditional Islam such as 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or modernist groups such as 
Muhammadiyah. This does not mean there is no 
resistance to the dolls at all,  as other Islamic transna-
tionalist movements oppose and reject this modern 
hybridization, which they consider to be a Western 
representation dressed in modern Islamic fashions. 
Transnational Islam, particularly the neo-salafism 
(such as Majelis Mujahaddin of Indonesia-MMI and 
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Front Pembela Islam-FPI, and Hisbut Tahir Indonesia-
HTI),43 intensely reject and refuse all items that exhibit 
Western influences, which they see as heresy, 
including these fashionable and modern busana 
Muslim clothes for modern Muslims and  Islamic 
dolls.44  
Most of the Salafist Islamic groups assert Islam as the 
ideology of the state to suit their political interest by 
prescribing Arabic style clothing as the only dress code 
for genuine Islamic identity.  Regardless of the identity 
politics that the dolls stir, Muslim dolls are obvious 
examples of  material culture that has been influenced 
by the processes of globalization and localization.45 To 
conclude, I would like to return to what Dr. Shahid 
Athar said regarding the Muslim community concern-
ing this phenomenon of Muslim dolls. His  statement 
has gained popularity among an Indonesian Muslim 
mailing list that poses an imagined conversation 
between Barbie and a Muslim Doll:
Barbie Doll: “Welcome to United State of America, 
land of freedom and bravery. Welcome and have a 
great fun!”
Muslim Doll: “What do you mean by freedom, 
bravery, and fun?”
Barbie Doll: “For us, freedom is the ability of all 
people to choose clothing and god. We are free to 
choose our lifestyle, friends, both male and fe-
males. The definition of bravery is the bravery to 
try drugs, alcohol, and sex!  Fun is dating, dancing, 
and drinking until drunk, anything that makes you 
happy!”
Muslim Doll: “For us, freedom is freedom of 
thought, freedom of speech, and freedom to wor-
ship God. For us, bravery is person who is brave 
enough to fight temptation, ‘syahwat’ desire, and 
hate. Are you brave? For us, fun is enjoying life 
with friends, family, and nature, not with Bobby or 
George (Barbie males).
Barbie Doll: “All of those are good lifestyle values, 
but you will soon forget it as fast as you forget your 
life, you will dissolved with your life, you will 
become as one of amongst us and you will have a 
boy friend like Bobby!”
Muslim Doll: “We will not worship what you are 
worshiping and you also will not worship of what 
we are worshiping. For you there is your way, for 
us this is our way”. 46 
Indonesian Muslim Dolls
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’Utsaimin rahimahullahu and Asy-Syaikh Shalih Al-Fauzan 
hafizhahullah. They said that perfect human-like doll is abso-
lutely forbidden. See this debate in 
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-boneka/  (retrieved December 11, 2007) and  Qardhawi, Yusuf. 
Halal dan Haram dalam Islam. No 2.3.6 “Rukhsah Dalam Per-
mainan Anak-Anak”, at 
http://media.isnet.org/islam/Qardhawi/Halal/2034.html (re-
trieved December 11, 2007).   
2 Reformation era is the era after the authoritarian New Order 
Regime, which began after 1998. From then on, the power of 
Islamic movements emerged stronger than before in public, 
particularly in challenging the nationalist political movements. 
For more on this topic see Riddel (2002). 
3 Plate (2002): 10.
4 Morgan (2000): 51. 
5 Plate (2002); see also Rampley (2005), Walker (1997), and 
Zolberg (1990).
6 This “field of vision” is Plate’s methodological approach for 
critiquing visual culture, and is elaborated by Rose (2007). That 
which is included in the field of visions is: 1) The image itself - 
what it looks like, its execution, physical materials, etc; 2) The 
relationship between the medium and the message, or form and 
content, of the image; 3) The creator of the image, including his 
or her ethnic, gender, sexual, racial, religious identity; 4) The 
nature of the language that surrounds the image in terms of 
explaining it, arguing against it, or for it; 5)The responses, on 
all sides, to the image – physical responses, verbal responses in 
news papers and journals, the response of the museum goers, 
legalistic responses; 6) The historical context of the image - in 
this case, among thousands of other images; 7) The identity of 
those who view the image; 8) The particular cultural crossings 
that are constantly taking place–in the image itself or in the 
creator itself; and 9) The role of social, political, and cultural 
institutions in the creation and reception of “art” (Plate 2002, p. 
5).
7 Religious transnationalism is a term for a new wave of 
religious movements that organize their networks across 
national borders, sometimes in conflict to movements within 
the nation-state. In the case of Indonesian Muslims, the term is 
usually attributed to the new movements other than Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyyah, the two major Islamic institutions 
within Indonesia.    
8 The images of modern, progress, and ‘civilization’ in 
Indonesia, not just Muslim community, generally refer to 
achievements of the ‘Western civilization’ (Mrázek 2006), but 
at the same time it seen as the actual source of the threat to 
‘local civilization’ (i.e. norm, culture, and values) (Laffan 
2003). In relation to the Muslim and modernity issue, Bellah 
(2000) clearly state that the problem of Muslim with modernity 
is actually a matter of the question whether modernity is able to 
fulfilled the various needs of modern Muslim religiosity effec-
tively; not about the modernization of politics, family, and 
individuality. Therefore, the creation of these Muslim dolls 
offers one of the answers on how Muslim religiosity copes with 
modernity.        
9 Barker (2004): 81.
10 Siregar (2007).
11 Based on research from the Freedom Institute and PPIM-
UIN Jakarta, the notion of imperialism prominent in 
contemporary Indonesian Muslim discourse, particularly the 
transnational Islam. It is actually a mixed feeling of belief and 
understanding that the Western world, generally represented by 
America, is still obsessed with the old agenda of colonialism 
and imperialism of the 19th century that is threatening to Islam. 
Indeed, imperialism is mixed up with a variety of terms: 
globalization, (neo) capitalism, (neo) liberalism, (neo) imperial-
ism of western world that makes a powerful cultural, political, 
and an economical homogenization impact on the Muslim 
world. See Mujani (2005) and the Freedom Institute –PPIM 
UIN Jakarta. Nalar-Jakarta.      
12 Huntington (1996).
13 For further discussion on the formation of nationalism of 
Indonesia and the role of Islam see Laffan (2003).
14 Ismail Raji Al-Faruqi a professor at McGill University 
(1921-1986) initially led the discursive movement for the Is-
lamization of knowledge, Arabism, and chaliphatism in the 
20th century. See the discussion at Azra (1996): 28-48.
15 Budiyanto (2006).
16 Ikhwanul Muslimin or Muslim Brotherhood was founded by 
Hassan Al Bana and his colleagues such as Sayyid Qutub and 
others in Egypt 1939. This movement initially started from 
education-based at mosques and madrasah, which is why it is 
popularly known as tarbiyah movements. For further issues on 
the influences of Ikhwanil Muslimin’ ideas (not to say ideol-
ogy) in Indonesian Muslim movements please see Rahmat 
(2008).  
17 Roy (2004): 247. 
18 Translation by author. See “Tren Boneka Muslim”. Nova.  
March 13, 2006. At 
http://www.tabloidnova.com/articles.asp?id=11090&no=2 
(retrieved December 11, 2007).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Translation by author. See Pengusaha, April 2006, “Peluang: 
Boneka Berbusana Muslim, Boleh Juga” at Peluang: Boneka 
Berbusana Muslim, Boleh Juga, 
http://www.majalahpengusaha.com/modules.php?op=modload
&name=News&file=article&sid=661  (retrieved December 11, 
2007).
22 Ritzer, cited in Siregar (2007): 123-124.
23 Siregar (2007): 123-26. What is ‘nothing’ for Ritzer is a 
globalized product that is generic, lacking local-ties—it is 
timeless, dehumanized, and disenchanted. Here, Siregar gave 
the notion of the ‘mall’ as an example, however debatable the 
example, in which as McDonalds, Coca-cola, or Barbie is also 
treated as global-product (which is ‘nothing’).
24 Even though, the Muslim world is not homogenous in its 
politics and ideology, today they share a monolithic discourse 
that is the ‘shariatization’ issue. 
25 Translation by author. See “Fulla, Boneka Modis Berbudi 
Sopan,” Kompas Cyber Media, 13 April 2007 at 
http://www2.kompas.com/ver1/Perempuan/0704/13/053459.ht
m (retrieved December 11, 2007).
26 See “Razanne, Boneka Muslim,” Republika. Januari 20, 
2005 at 
http://www.republika.co.id/koran_detail.asp?id=184557&kat_i
d=329&kat_id1=&kat_id2= (retrieved December 11, 2007).
27 Ibid.   
28 For the details of the impact and the Indonesian’s umma 
hope on Pan-Islamic see Laffan (2003).
29 See this Muslim assumption at Budiyanto (2006).
30 Girard (1977). 
31 Prabasmoro (2003): 94-95.
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32 Therefore, as Prabasmoro argues through a reading of Hall 
(1998), local capital (the producer) should develop its certain 
“globality values” in its local product to be easily recognized 
by its consumer, while not entirely losing its centrality. In fact, 
one may see that actually it is really a matter of global Islam 
vis-à-vis global capitalism, which is usually perceived as West-
ern. Indeed, historically and culturally, Islam has been made out 
by Indonesian Muslims as being “local”, making Muslim Bar-
bie dolls more powerful and marketable than their ‘traditional 
and indigenous’ counterparts. The discussion on mimicry and 
hybridization in postcolonial era of Indonesian can be seen at 
Prabosmoro (2003): 94-95 and Ahmed (1999). 
33 Majalah Pengusaha (2006).
34 Boneka Muslim.  ‘Jelang Sore’ (News program). (2008, 
August 1).  Jakarta, Trans TV.
35 Siregar (2007): 96.
36 Pengajian is a regular meeting of mostly women reciting the 
Quran, whilst Arisan is mostly womens groups conducting 
regular social gatherings whose members contribute to and take 
turns at winning an aggregate sum of money.  
37 Siregar (2007): 94
38 Geary (1986): 169-194.
39 Islamic society; in which individuals and groups within it 
should be subject to Islamic norms and morality.
40 Azumardi (1994).
41 Nova 13 March 2006.
42 Jones (2007).
43 Once in 2008, at the Islamic Book Fair event, I saw how 
differently they displayed the Arrosa dolls with the ‘Aa Gyms’ 
dolls (the doll made in Bandung inspired by Aa Gym 
community); the Arrosa was placed on the floor and scattered 
around with used books, meanwhile the ‘Aa Gym’ dolls were 
beautifully arranged (See Image 4). About the Aa Gym move-
ment see Solahudin (2008).             
44 For modern clothing most of the Salafist ulama reject any 
un-Islamic representation, although debatable enough, dolls are 
strictly avoided in most of salafist theology. See the debates at 
http://muttaqun.com/clotheswithpictures.html (retrieved De-
cember 11, 2007).     
45 Robertson (1992) and Robertson (1995).
46 Translation by author. See the debate about Barbie vs. 
Muslim doll by Dr. Shahid Athar See at 
http://qitori.wordpress.com/2007/03/08/boneka-Barbie-boneka-
muslim/ (retrieved December 11, 2007).
